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The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn
Simon N. Verdun-Jones*
1. Introduction
Jurisprudence means to me: any careful and sustained thinking
about any phase of things legal, if the thinking seeks to reach
beyond the practical solution of an immediate problem in hand.
Jurisprudence thus includes any type at all of honest and
thoughtful generalization in the field of the legal.'
Alongside Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn dominated the American
jurisprudential stage for more than thirty years. Indeed, his diverse
interests, broadly-based achievements and colorful personality com-
pel the attention of any serious student of modern jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the very profusion of roles played by Llewellyn render
him one of the most remarkable legal scholars of the twentieth
century: looking at the totality of his life's work one may readily
discern the ardent young realist brandishing the flag of reform and
extolling the virtues of science; the accomplished law-teacher dedi-
cated to the transfer of basic legal skills and the enhancement of legal
education in general; the incurable romantic and amateur poet; the
tireless Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code; and,
finally, the wise old sage giving "common sense advice" to the
appellate practitioner.
2
As is the case with Roscoe Pound, Llewellyn's jurisprudence
must be seen as evolving over a long period of time and it is most
helpful to view his work as falling into three more or less clearly
defined stages; firstly, there is the period of Llewellyn's flamboyant
legal realism characterized by such leading articles as A Realistic
Jurisprudence - The Next Step (1930) and Some Realism about
Realism (1931); this period is followed by a stage during which
*Simon N. Verdun-Jones, Lecturer in Law, The University of Sydney. The author
wishes to express his thanks to Professors McDougal and Reisman of Yale Law
School for their critical comments on the manuscript, which is part of a larger project
being prepared for the degree of J.S.D. at Yale Law School.
1. K. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society 11: unpublished manuscript quoted by W.L.
Twining in Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1973).
2. Twining, op. cit., passim, note chapter 6 in particular.
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Llewellyn developed an anthropological approach towards law and is
most conspicuously marked by his joint-work with E. Adamson
Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1943). Finally, Llewellyn's jurispru-
dence entered a period during which his main concern was with the
re-establishment of confidence in the American appellate system. Of
course, this final stage is marked by Llewellyn's massive tome, The
Common Law Tradition (1960).
Perhaps the most fruitful - if not the most vociferous -
elements in Llewellyn's Jurisprudence are to be found in the middle
period of his development and much of our analysis is drawn from the
sources of The Cheyenne Way and the Yale Law Journal article, The
Normative, The Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method (1940). This is not to deny the immense wisdom and influ-
ence of his earlier works but merely an attempt to tap the most mature
and considered aspects of Llewellyn's approach to law and society.
We shall draw on Llewellyn's early works primarily for their valu-
able insight into the fundamental pre-requisites for the development
of an empirical legal science. On the other hand, since it was the only
major project he devoted to a comprehensive analysis of a modern
legal system, The Common Law Tradition will be utilized primarily
in the identification of the basic intellectual tasks performed by
Llewellyn's Jurisprudence. However, it should be recognized that
The Common Law Tradition represents a significant departure from
the tone and substance of Llewellyn's other works; for this reason the
book will not be treated as a definitive expostion of Llewellyn's
approach-particularly in so far as questions of method are concerned.
The precise nature of the relationship between The Common
Law Tradition and Llewellyn' s earlier publications is a matter of deep
controversy. Llewellyn himself argued that it was an "authentic
product" of realist thought. However, even well-disposed critics
have pointed to the many inconsistencies between the Llewellyn of
the realist era and the Llewellyn of The Common Law Tradition:
With all deference to those who extol the merits of The Common
Law Tradition and with full appreciation of the surpassing
merits thus attributed to it, I do not like this work so much as the
Jurisprudence, nor do I feel any of the excitement experienced
when reading some of his earlier writings. The Common Law
Tradition is a quaint mixture of common sense, craftsmanship,
poetry and religion. His metaphorical comparison of it to a
Gothic structure is felicitous in that it is indeed a massive
structure of 565 pages, with a pinnacle reaching towards legal
certainty as if aspriing to the heavens. Within the cathedral one
finds the exhertic and now saint Llewellyn who has long been
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striving on the messianic mission of recapturing legal certainty
from the abyss of skepticism. He is preaching in Llewellynese
the "Grand Style" of the "Common Law Tradition" to the
lawmen who have lost confidence in inscrutable appellate
courts.
3
Where inconsistencies appear between The Common Law Tradition
and earlier works we shall not consider the final book of Llewellyn's
career to be necessarily representative of his most mature thought.
4
2. The Establishment of Observational Standpoint
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Llewellyn pays considerable
attention to the vexed issue of observational standpont. Fundamental
to his whole position is the simple, although often misunderstood,
premise that the values of the observer must be studiously set aside
during the actual process of observation. This uncomplicated belief
appears to be all that Llewellyn had in mind when he published his
3. T. Hayakawa, "Karl N. Llewellyn as a Lawman from Japan Sees him" (1964),
18 Rutgers L. Rev. 717, 727-8.
Hayakawa's predilection for Llewellyn's early work stands in sharp contrast: "The
contribution Llewellyn made in the early 30's to the cause of legal science was
magnificent. This is why I like Llewellyn the young realist revolting against the
traditionalists and charting new areas and methods for scientific exploration better
than Llewellyn the old realist spending idle words on the "Grand Style", just as I like
the Pound who addressed the American Bar Association in 1906 better than the
Pound who addressed the same association in, say, 1963." (at 730).
4. This is not to deny the immense utility of The Common Law Tradition. Rather it
is an attempt to stress that Llewellyn did not follow the precepts of empirical legal
science which he had laid down in his more theoretical works. The rather amateurish
methods employed in The Common Law Tradition certainly detract from the stature
of the work but they do not render it valueless to modern legal science. As Professor
Twining suggests; "the basic perceptions and analysis of the book are sound and
show ways to a more profound understanding of appellate judicial decision-making
than any prior analysis. It contrasts sharply with the graceful simplicities of Cardozo
on the one hand and the facile and shallow scientism of much jurimetric analysis on
the other. The chief weaknesses are remediable: the terminology can be refined;
more orderly techniques for analysing and comparing judicial opinions may be
evolved; better methods for testing predictability have begun to be devised, and so
on. The crux of the matter is that The Common Law Tradition is founded on a number
of apercus, some original, others neglected, which are of fundamental importance
and which provide a starting-point for a wide range of potentially fruitful investiga-
tions: the steadying factors; the styles of judicial opinions; the range of techniques for
interpreting cases and statutes; techniques of appellate advocacy and of other
specialized roles; even the elusive 'situation sense' are among the ideas that could
inspire valuable research. These are the more obvious ones related to the general
argument; there are many other suggestive obiter dicta buried in the detailed
analysis. Despite its faults, The Common Law Tradition promises to be a rich source
of insight into judicial processes for many years to come." Twining, op. cit., at 269.
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controversial article, Some Realism About Realism (193 1);5 in this
famed treatise he urges a temporary divorce of the "is" and the
"ought" as a means of enhancing the basic methodology of legal
science. 6 Drawing heavily upon his sociological mentor, Max
Weber, 7 Llewellyn asserts that while values may well dictate the
objectives of any particular inquiry they can not be allowed to
impinge upon the process of observation itself.8 His position is
perhaps stated more comprehensively in another realist tract pub-
lished in the same year; "We have to add value judgments as to where
people ought to want to go; we have to criticize both their practices
and their ethics with that in view. But what we must not lose sight of
. . . is that as we move into these value judgments we desert entirely
the solid sphere of individual ideals and subjectivity . . . Science
does not teach us where to go. It never will. To fuse is and ought is to
confuse the gradually accumulating semi-permanent data on which
any science must rest with the flux of changing opinion as to social
objective - that welter of objectives any of which a science can be
made to serve."- 9
In Llewellyn's view, the best way for the legal observer to
maintain impartiality was for him to view law as an "ongoing
institution". 10 He believed that such a viewpoint was valuable be-
cause it placed legal rules, concepts, and ideals against the back-
ground of institutional practices which gives them meaning and life.
Furthermore this viewpoint suggested two "vitally serviceable points
of orientation": ". . . first, a going institution has jobs to do, and its
5. Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1962) Ch. 2.
6. Ibid., at 55-56.
7. For the influence of Max Weber on Llewellyn's thought, see G. Gurvitch, The
Sociology of Law (Philosophical Library and Alliance Book Corporation, New York,
1942) 178; E. A. Hoebel, "Karl Llewellyn: Anthropological Jurisprude" (1964), 18
Rutgers L. Rev. 735, 740 n. 21; Twining, op. cit., at 107-108, 180, 183, 353. It is
interesting to note that Llewellyn framed his early conception of a legal right on the
basis of Weber's formulation: ". . . Max Weber's magnificent formulation in terms
of probability: a right (or practice or "real" rule) exists to the extent that a likelihood
exists that A can induce a court to squeeze, out of B, A's damages; more: to the extent
that the likely collections which will cover A's damage" . . . For further discussion
of this approach see K. Olivecrona, Law as Fact (Stevens and Son, London, second
ed. 1971) 173-4.
8. See generally T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action Vol. 2 (Free Press
Edition, New York, 1968) 600-1.
9. "Legal Tradition and Social Science Method - A Realist's Critique" (1931),
in, Jurisprudence, ch. 3, at 85-87.
10. My Philosophy of Law (Boston Law Book Co., Boston, 1941) 183 ff., 185.
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function is to get them done effectively and well. This gives a pole of
purpose and value to measure by. And, secondly, a going institution
has results in life, and must be tested by them; and those results are
capable of inquiry. The measure of the institution is, then, the
measure of how its results check in fact, in regard to the actual doing
of its jobs."" It was this viewpoint that Llewellyn put into harness
for his stimulating works, The Cheyenne Way (1943) and The Norma-
tive, The Legal and The Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method
(1940).
It is instructive to note that Llewellyn's viewpoint is considera-
bly broader than that adopted by many of his realist colleagues and in
1940 he devoted considerable space to a disparagement of the exces-
sively narrow observational standpoint that characterized the writ-
ings of the early realists. 12 In his view, the "newer Jurisprudence"
began life almost exclusively as a lawyer's Jurisprudence; that is to
say, it adopted the standpoint of the legal counsellor who is primarily
concerned with the prediction of cases as a consequence of his duty to
advise potential clients as to the probable state of the law. This early
standpoint is perhaps most characteristic of those realists who es-
poused the legal pragmatism of Justice Holmes. From this beginning,
realism expanded its viewpoint to include that of the advocate, who
directs his energies towards persuading particular courts of the over-
whelming 'rightness' of his legal submissions. One immediate result
of the development of this standpoint was, according to Llewellyn,
the stimulation of research into the subjective factors that sway the
course of judicial decision-making. However, Llewellyn felt that
even the adoption of these two standpoints was grossly misleading for
it obviously excluded the standpoint of the most dominant participant
in the legal process - namely the judge:
... obviously the branch of Jurisprudence which is concerned
with the judge and the judge's work must see the judge in a
wholly different light. A counsellor has to worry over what a
judge will do, whether that doing is right or whether it is not
right; right or wrong, it decides a case; right or wrong, decent or
indecent, it may make or remake a rule. For a counsellor at work
on counselling what the courts do is thus the important part of
the law; whether, I repeat, the doing is right or not. But judges
• ..cannot see law that way, nor can citizens, as citizens, see
law that way . . . This is not to say that the 'Prediction-of-
11. Ibid., at 185.
12. "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence" (1940), in Jurisprudence
ch. 7.
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official-action' way of seeing law is a bad way or a wrong way to
see law; it is to say that the prediction way is an incomplete way
to see law.'
3
However, it must not be thought that Llewellyn was advocating that
modern jurisprudence should adopt the standpoint of the judge nor,
indeed, that of any other participant in the legal process; on the
contrary, he urges a complete transformation in the level of legal
analysis. It was clearly his firm belief that the modern jurist must
adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer viewing the law in
strictly functional terms with the objective of understanding rather
than influencing the social process. By studying law as an ongoing
institution, Llewellyn hoped to transcend the 'participant' standpoint
favored by far too many of the legal realists.14
3. Llewellyn's Conception of Science
• . . Knowledge does not have to be scientific, in order to be on
the way toward science. Neither does it have to be scientific in
order to be extremely useful. It is time that social 'scientists'
should recognize this openly, it would save much confusion,
and it would save more waste motion. What we need is know-
ledge moving carefully and cannily toward the scientific pole,
accompanied by some rough indication of its present latitude.
That is the scientific road toward science. And progress on that
road is valuable step by step. 1
5
Llewellyn does not seem to have been influenced by any particular
model of science nor did he engage in the type of philosophy of
science thinking which characterized the work of such colleagues as
Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook, or Hessel Yntema. Indeed,
13. Ibid., at 141-142.
14. It is ironic to note that Llewellyn had great difficulty restraining himself from
adopting a participant standpoint, however. For example, when Llewellyn under-
took extensive fieldwork in New Mexico (during the summers of 1945-9, and 1951)
he abandoned his original scientific viewpoint for the role of an activist in Pueblo
Indian affairs. The result of the project was a series of legal codes [largely drafted by
Llewellyn himself] rather than a development of the approach adopted in The
Cheyenne Way. Note that Llewellyn was struck by the apparent similarities between
the "parentalism" of the Pueblos, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other.
Unfortunately, Llewellyn's important theoretical insight was never brought to frui-
tion - although outlines of his thinking on this matter are preserved in manuscript
form. The failure to capitalize on this insight may well be attributable to Llewellyn's
wish to render practical assistance to the exclusion of the more painstaking process of
non-participant observation and theory construction. See generally Twining, op.
cit., at 358-365 and Appendix F.
15. K. Llewellyn, "The Theory of Legal 'Science"' (1941), 21 N. Carolina L.
Rev. 1-23, quoted in Twining, op. cit., at 191.
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as professor Twining points out, Llewellyn was quick to recognize
the latent dangers involved in drawing an overly rigid analogy be-
tween the social and the natural sciences:
.. . He was willing to accept that ultimately it is conceivable
that empirical research in the social sciences could satisfy simi-
lar criteria of objectivity to those of natural science, but that only
the most elementary beginnings had been made in that direction;
second, that 'objectivity' is a matter of degree and that even
casual impressionistic observation is better than complete ig-
norance, provided that it is recognized for what it is; thirdly, that
stress on the scientific analogy may be dangerous in that either
the coinage of the term 'scientific' may be debased or, worse,
that would-be scientists will consider as worthy of study only
topics which are as yet susceptible to rigorous quantification, a
narrow and often infertile area. In short, he favoured a common
sense strategy for research, based on a realistic appraisal of the
obstacles in the way of quick advance, such as the cost, the lack
of glamour in much of the work, and the shortage of personnel
with appropriate training.1
6
However, in addition to his valuable discussion of observational
standpoint Llewellyn contributed to the advancement of empirical
legal science by his development of research methods specifically
designed for the study of legal phenomena within their broader social
context: these were the so-called "institutional" method and its more
16. Twining, op. cit., at 195-196. While Professor Twining is perfectly correct in
stressing Llewellyn's "pragmatic and sensible approach" to the issues of empirical
science, it is the present writer's view that this characterization is seriously mislead-
ing [at least in so far as it suggests Llewellyn did not subscribe to a coherent
philosophy of empirical science]. In at least two major articles, Llewellyn wrestles
most successfully with the fundamental issues facing the social scientist engaged in
the study of legal institutions and it is unlikely that Llewellyn ignored his own
wisdom when he embarked upon such empirical projects as The Cheyenne Way.
Indeed the two articles concerned are an eloquent and sophisticated statement of the
fundamental pre-requisites for an empirical legal science [see "Legal Tradition and
Social Science Method - A Realist's Critique" (1931) and "Law and the Social
Sciences - Especially Sociology" (1949)]. Inexplicably, Twining ignores these
works in assessing Llewellyn;s approach to legal science. The admitted sloppiness of
the research involved in Llewellyn's early work, Behind the Law of Divorce
(1932-33), and in his later book, The Common Law Tradition should not blind us to
the fact that Llewellyn made a significant contribution to the theory of an empirical
legal science. For example, the observational standpoint and conceptual categories
developed by Llewellyn and Hoebel in The Cheyenne Way surely amount to a much
more sophisticated approach to legal science than Twining's characterization would
at first suggest. While it is true that Llewellyn was justifiably skeptical about basing
legal research upon a natural science model, it is also important to recognize that he
did much to develop an empirical approach to law based on a model with an integrity
of its own and with a more specific relevance to legal phenomena. It appears that
Twining under-estimates Llewellyn's contribution in this respect.
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celebrated off-spring, the "trouble-case" method. The former of
these techniques is admittedly more of a general orientation than a
specific method but it is fair to say that it was an orientation which
paved the way for concrete co-operation between lawyers and social
scientists: In Llewellyn's words, "All you have to do is to borrow a
concept from sociology: Institution, and to make explicit that you
include therein the relevant physical equipment and the manner of
organization of the whole; and Pound's picture of the law - the
institution of law - becomes forthwith a something which any social
scientist can look at, understand, make friends with, learn from, and
can probably contribute to."17
Now Llewellyn did not invent the "institutional method", in-
deed it was common coin in the 1930's,18 but he was responsible for
giving it tangible utility in the form of the trouble-case method. This
latter technique essentially consists of an in-depth analysis of the
life-history of a dispute from inception to resolution. The context in
which Llewellyn applied this method was the legal system of the
Cheyenne Indians and its development was clearly the result of his
close association with Hoebel during the years preceding the publica-
tion of The Cheyenne Way.
By utilizing the trouble-case method, Llewellyn believed that
the legal researcher was enabled to examine the whole complex of
institutional processes involved in the settling of disputes: "The
trouble cases, sought out and examined with care, are . . . the safest
main road to the discovery of law. Their data are most certain. Their
yield is richest. They are the most revealing." 19 Furthermore, in
Llewellyn's view, this novel focus on the trouble case was an abso-
lutely indispensable supplement to the ideological approach to legal
research (with its emphasis on rules) and to the descriptive approach
(with its emphasis on bare physical operations).
The numerous claims made on behalf of the trouble-case method
have been succinctly summarized by W. L. Twining:
... by studying actual cases the phenomenon of competing
norms can be perceived and understood; it overcomes the prob-
17. "Law and the Social Sciences - Especially Sociology" in Jurisprudence
ch. 15, at 355.
18. See the influence of institutional economics on Thurman Arnold and Underhill
Moore, for example. For an influential contemporary account of the institutional
approach, see W. H. Hamilton, "Institution" in 8 Ency. of the Social Sciences
(Macmillan, New York, 1937) 84.
19. The Cheyenne Way, 29.
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lem of refusal or inability of informants to articulate norms; the
extent of coincidence or divergence between articulated norms
and the outcomes of dispute-settlement processes can be
checked; trouble cases show how established forms are in fact
used, which is more illuminating than a bare statement of the
form; the relationship between the "law" of the group and the"sub-law stuff" of each sub-group may be brought out by the
study of disputes; in a crisis one can actually see the culture at
work; and finally, trouble-cases are in themselves important
phenomena.20
Unfortunately, it is one of the tragedies of Jurisprudence that Llewel-
lyn and Hoebel never used their finely conceived intellectual tool in
the study of an ongoing legal system. Instead the "cases" analysed in
The Cheyenne Way date from the period 1820 through 1880 and were
gleaned from elderly informants speaking through an interpreter; in
other words, the data for the project was based entirely on memory
and hear-say concerning incidents that happened up to one hundred
and twenty years before the subjects were interviewed. Twining has
defended the intellectual integrity of The Cheyenne Way by making
the valid point that the informants' stories are significant (even if
fictitious) because they are told in terms of Cheyenne concepts and
against the background of actual institutions: "an essential part of
understanding the institutions of a society is to grasp the ways of
thought of the people whose institutions they are". 2 1 However,
Twining's argument is not really germane to the particular case of
The Cheyenne Way; while a knowledge of the concepts prevalent in a
culture is absolutely essential to a genuine understanding of legal
institutions, it is important to recognize that such knowledge is - at
best - only a supplement to a systematic examination of those
institutions. Unfortunately, Llewellyn's reconstruction of the
Cheyenne legal system was the result not of systematic historical
research but of sketchy information relayed by a handful of elderly
informants, many of whom had not actually seen Cheyenne legal
processes in action. In these particular circumstances, it is difficult to
comprehend how Twining can assert that the interviewees' stories
were told "against a background of actual institutions"; quite
clearly, Llewellyn and Hoebel had no reliable information in this
respect.
20. W. L. Twining, "Two Works of Karl Llewellyn (1968), 31 Modern L.
Rev. 171, at p. 171. See also Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 160-161.
21. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and The Realist Movement 162-63.
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Curiously enough, Llewellyn never applied the trouble-case
method to a modern legal system or sub-legal system: it is probable
that the method is far too unwieldy for research into the dispute-
settlement procedures of a complex society. However, the method
clearly had potential in so far as an ongoing legal system of reasona-
ble simplicity was concerned: indeed, Twining asserts that the
trouble-case became a "critical focus of attention" for modern an-
thropological research into "primitive" legal systems. 22 Neverthe-
less, despite Twining's assertion to the contrary, it is difficult to find
evidence for the view that the trouble-case method has become a
fundamental tool in the methodology of modern research in this area:
it appears that the method has influenced - but not dominated -
such research. 23 Whatever the present status of the trouble-case
method may be, however, it is important to recognize that - aside
from Underhill Moore - Karl Llewellyn was practically alone
among legal scholars in developing concrete methods of research for
the study of legal institutions; if for this reason alone, the method
must retain a significant position in the history of twentieth century
Jurisprudence.
A further pre-requisite for an empirical legal science is the
development of an adequate conceptual framework; in his theoretical
articles, Llewellyn clearly recognized this need. For example, as
early as 1931 he was making such clear statements as this: ". . . the
framing of concepts and the integration of a conceptual scheme for
the purpose of finding out where we are .. .will remain eternally
22. Twining, op. cit., at 164.
23. A search of the writers listed (without detailed references) by Twining reveals
considerable deference to Llewellyn's historical contribution but no solid evidence
of the trouble-case being the "crucial focus of attention". Max Gluckman - a friend
of Hoebel's - recognizes the importance of Llewellyn's detailed treatment of
individual cases but it is clear that his own work is not built on the trouble-case
method. Bohannon and Gulliver refer to Llewellyn only tangentially. See M.
Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia
(Humanities Press Inc., New York, 1955). See especially 1967 ed. at 372: Politics,
Law, and Ritual in a Tribal Society (Mentor Press, New York, 1965). See also P.
Bohannon, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv (Oxford University Press for the
International African Institute, London, 1957); P. H. Gulliver, Social Control in an
African Society (N.Y.U. Press, New York, 1963). For recent discussion of this.
issue, see M. Gluckman, "Limitations of the Case - Law Method in the Study of
Tribal Law" (1973), 7 Law & Society Review 611; J. F. Holleman, "Trouble-Cases
and Trouble-less Cases in the Study of Customary Law and Legal Reform" ibid., at
585; W. L. Twining, "Law and Anthropology: A case Study in Inter-Disciplinary
Collaboration" ibid., at 561.
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necessary to scientific advance . . . without rigid definition of con-
cepts no hypothesis which means anything is possible, and without a
hypothesis which unambiguously means one thing attempted obser-
vation or research into new data or old is somewhere between 90 and
95 percent waste motion from which derives that fundamental of
science: only the gift of posing meaningful hypothesis leads
anywhere.'24
However, it is fairly clear that Llewellyn was never really able to
develop a conceptual scheme which could generate general hypoth-
eses about law and the social system and which could guide empirical
research in the future. Llewellyn's theory of the law-jobs is, as we
shall see, only an analysis of basic functions performed by legal
institutions: the theory does not provide for a study of such vital
elements as the structure of social and legal institutions, the power
process, and the creation of policy. The reason for Llewellyn's
inability to develop a conceptual scheme is largely attributable to his
deficiencies in method. As we have indicated above, Llewellyn's use
of the trouble-case method was seriously deficient because it failed to
examine the social and political structure of Cheyenne society: with-
out such information, Llewellyn was unable to develop comprehen-
sive theories about the integration of law and social process. 25 More
simply, Llewellyn fell into the snare which frequently besets the
24. "Legal Tradition and Social Science Method- A Realist's Critique" in Essays
on Research in the Social Sciences (Brookings Institute, New York, 1931) 94.
25. It may be convenient at this point, to consider a statement made by one of the
modern critics of Legal Realism, W. E. Rumble Jr. Rumble, in American Legal
Realism (Cornell U. Press, New York, 1968) 34, asserts that Llewellyn writes under
a "model of a natural science of law" yet it is most difficult to discover where he
obtains the evidence for this. Surely there is a striking contrast between the work of
Llewellyn and the work of such realists as W. W. Cook, Herman Oliphant, and
Underhill Moore who do espouse the cause of a natural science of law? In particular,
it appears that Rumble completely ignores the crucial influence of Max Weber upon
Llewellyn's work. Of course, it is always possible that Rumble is not using the term
"natural science of law" in its correct sense.
There is also considerable difficulty in accepting further comments of Rumble in this
connection: "They (the legal realists) did not lack theoretical models from which
operationalized hypotheses could have been inferred. The approaches urged by
Llewellyn (in his articles of the 1930's) and Cohen are examples. Each of these men
provided a framework in terms of which significant empirical investigations could
have been undertaken. . .Nonetheless, most of the realists did not infer the kinds of
hypotheses which are necessary. . .Llewellyn is a case in point. The model of legal
science which he formulated in his early books and articles certainly provided a
framework from which operationalized hypotheses could have been inferred and
tested. To the best of my knowledge, however, the inferences were not drawn and the
testing was not done:" Rumble, op. cit., at 172-173.
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functional theorist, namely the tendency to postulate ana priori list of
functions and then to find social institutions which perform them2 6: in
Llewellyn's case, social institutions were not studied at close quarters
and the result was a conceptual scheme which looked only to func-
tions and dealt with actual institutions only as an afterthought. 27 This
is a theme to which we shall return in our discussion of Llewellyn's
focus of inquiry.
In sum, we may say that Llewellyn's perception of the basic
requirements for the development of an empirical legal science was
most astute. However, in his attempts to fulfill these requirements he
did not meet with similar success. The reasons for this gap in
conception and execution are not simply stated but it is suggested that
the failure of contemporary social scientists to devote their attention
to the problems of "concretizing" social research in law was a major
factor. Clearly Llewellyn did not lack ideas; however, he did lack the
collaboration of mature social scientists capable of making those
ideas amenable to satisfactory research.
It is difficult to grasp Rumble's reasoning at this point. The early period of
Llewellyn's work surely lacks the binding unity of a theoretical model. Indeed, a
contemporary comment makes this quite clear: "The problem which bothers me is
whether such a description of the actual behaviour of officials can be undertaken
without a conceptual scheme of some sort - no metaphysical scheme of "eternal
truths", but a hypothetical scheme of scientific concepts with which to order the
social materials in terms of similar material elsewhere:" C. J. Friedrich, "Remarks
on Llewellyn's View of Law, Official Behaviour, and Political Science" (1935), 50
Political Science Qrtly. 419. Similarly, we have criticized Llewellyn's middle period
for its exclusively functional approach with its consequent lack of concern for
questions of social structure; as a result, we have seen that The Cheyenne Way did not
stimulate Llewellyn to develop any form of theoretical model from which general
hypotheses about the relationship between law and society can be inferred. In the
light of these observations, it must be said that while one may agree with Rumble that
Llewellyn's work is lacking in operationalized hypotheses one must also point out
that this failing stems rather from the complete lack of an adequate theoretical model
than from a mere reluctance to generalize from such a model. In this respect, Rumble
seriously misrepresents the nature of Llewellyn's work. For further discussion of the
relationship between Llewellyn's empirical work and legal realism, see F. K. Beutel,
"The Relationship of Experimental Jurisprudence to Other Schools of Jurisprudence
and to Scientific Method" (1971), 3 Washington U.L.Q. 385, esp. 392-393.
26. 0. Young, Systems of Political Science (Foundations of Modern Political
Science Series: Prentice Hall Inc., New York, 1968) 30-36.
27. A further weakness of Llewellyn's scheme stems from his tendency to analyse
institutions in terms of individual psychology. See Hayakawa, op. cit., at 724-25:
"The Cheyenne Way seems to have been inspired by Freudian psychology and the
American anthropology of Ruth F. Benedict whose approach, characterized by
emphasis on cultural configurations and cultural patterns, is also becoming obsolete.
The authors ...erred in the choice and use of conceptual tools and frames of
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4. The Delimitation of a Focus of Inquiry
Llewellyn lays considerable emphasis upon the need to find a suitable
'point of reference' for legal research. In his view, rules should never
be the focal point of jurisprudential investigation; on the contrary, if
Jurisprudence is to be numbered among the social sciences then it
must center thought on behavior - and in particular upon the interac-
tion between behavior of law-officials on the one hand and that of
laymen on the other. More precisely, Llewellyn places the dispute at
the heart of legal inquiry: "Disputes are the eternal heart and core of
the law. They do not mark its circumference but they will always
mark its center":
28
What, then, is this law business about; It is about the fact that
our society is honeycombed with disputes. Disputes actual and
potential; disputes to be settled and disputes to be prevented;
both appealing to law, both making up the business of the law
• . . This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it
reasonably, is the business of the law. And the people who have
the doing in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks
or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these officials
do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself. 
29
In The Cheyenne Way, Llewellyn carries this focus of inquiry one
step further and centers his thought upon the concept of the 'trouble-
case'. By following this main road of inquiry, he believed that it is
possible to shed light on three fundamental questions for any student
of society; (1) in any particular society, who is it that takes official
action? (2) and with what support of opinion or active aid? (3) and to
what extent does any given legal norm penetrate to the variegated
levels of the social fabric?
By adopting this focus of inquiry, Llewellyn makes it clear that
Jurisprudence should not confine its energies to the study of judicial
behavior alone; indeed, in his view, the behavior of other officials
was of equal importance as an object of inquiry; in one of his very first
articles he said: ". . . the focus, the center of the law, is not merely
what the judge does, in the impact of that doing on the interested
reference for analysing and interpreting social facts. Social facts are to be analysed
and interpreted in the context of society as a whole, not in terms of individual
psychology. The "loose" structure and arrangement of the work and, more impor-
tantly, the weakness of basic empirical data gathered by inadequate field work are by
modem standards serious deficiencies."
28. "Legal Tradition and Social Science Method", 79.
29. The Bramble Bush (1930: Tentative Student Edition, Columbia University Law
School; Oceana Press, New York, 1951) 2-3.
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party, but what any official does, officially."130 However, while
Llewellyn did adopt a broad focus of inquiry when he studied the
law-ways of the Cheyenne, he clearly did not maintain this focus
when he turned his attention to the modern American legal system.
Unfortunately, Llewellyn's focus of inquiry was another instance of
his failing to follow the precepts he had so eloquently stated in his
theoretical works. Indeed, the vast bulk of his writings concentrate
fairly and squarely upon the judicial decision and completely exclude
the very factors he had so piously placed at the heart of his apocalyp-
tic call for a "New Jurisprudence". In particular, The Common Law
Tradition - the culmination of Llewellyn's jurisprudential en-
deavors - merely follows the mainstream of legal realism in its
slavish adherence to the study of judicial decisions. In the words of
Professor Harry Jones: "What happened after 1930 is that realist
scholarship came to be concentrated on the judicial process and to
deal only incidentally with the work of nonjudicial officials and
hardly at all with the area of contact between official action and
societal behavior. "31
The explanation for Llewellyn's desertion of his principles may
well be that, while the 'dispute' is an excellent focus for the study of
relatively simple social systems such as that of the Cheyenne Indians,
it is far too unwieldy an instrument for the productive examination of
a complex modern legal system - particularly if the jurist has no
adequate conceptual map of the social process as a whole. Neverthe-
less, this explanation hardly accounts for Llewellyn's neglect of
matters that he had frequently declared to be central to his program
for a Modern Jurisprudence.
5. The Balance of Emphasis upon Operations and Perspectives
"What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the Law
itself." '32 "Without anybody's reading either the context or
the rest of the 'Bramble Bush' . . . this lone sentence became,
internationally, the cited goblin-painting of realism." 33
30. "A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step" (1930) in Jurisprudence ch. 1,
at 31.
31. H. W. Jones, "A View from the Bridge, Law and Society", a Supplement to the
Summer Issue of Social Problems (1965) 39, 40.
32. The Bramble Bush 2-3.
33. The Common Law Tradition - Deciding Appeals (1960) 511. For a detailed
discussion of the context in which The Bramble Bush was written, see Twining, op.
cit., at 140-152. Readers of the book need to remember that it represents a realtively
young Llewellyn addressing first year students rather than the older Llewellyn
addressing experienced lawyers or fellow jurists. (at 147-148).
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The balance of emphasis upon operations and perspectives in the
works of Karl Llewellyn is probably more even-handed than in the
case of any other legal realist. In his early writings, no doubt the
scales were somewhat weighted in favor of operations as a sharp
reaction to what the realists perceived as the rule and concept oriented
Jurisprudence of the past; as Llewellyn himself said, the realists
wanted to "deal with things, with people, with tangibles, with
definite tangibles, and observable relations between definite tangi-
bles - not with words alone." 34 Nevertheless, such inclinations did
not prompt Llewellyn to place legal rules and concepts on a par with
the squeakings of Watsonian rats. Unlike his behavioralist col-
leagues, he did not reduce legal science to a mere recording of
physical behavior stripped of the meaning attributed to such behavior
by the relevant actors in the social process. Indeed, Llewellyn's early
acquaintance with the works of Max Weber encouraged him to
campaign for a legal science of a radically different mould from the
rigid natural-science methodology of his one-time Columbia col-
league - Underhill Moore. As a consequence, Llewellyn avoided
the behaviorist fallacy that bedevilled much of Moore's jurispruden-
tial endeavors and he achieved an adequate balance in emphasis upon
operations and perspectives.
As we have seen from our discussion of the focus of inquiry,
Llewellyn's firm belief that Jurisprudence must be securely anchored
on the base of an empirical legal science led him to stress in his early
writings the urgent need for a science of observation and it is hardly
surprising that he laid great emphasis upon the wide gulf often
existing between the words and actual practices of legal officials:
Above all ... what looms large ... is the difference between
the words and the practices of officials. It is not what stands on
the books, but what happens, which is the center of attention. It
is not the purpose of any legal rule, or the purpose of official
action, but the kind and quality of the action itself which is of
primary concern... we remain concerned primarily with what
officials do and the effects of their doing. (Including of course
their saying in their doing, if, as, and when their saying makes a
difference) a.35
It is quite clear from this passage that Llewellyn's urgent appeal for a
study of judicial behavior certainly does not entail a simultaneous
abandonment of a study of their perspectives. Indeed, even when he
is brandishing the flag of legal realism in his most vociferous manner,
34. "Some Realism about Realism" (1931) in Jurisprudence, ch. 2, at 43.
35. "Legal Tradition and Social Science Method" 80-81.
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Llewellyn deprecates the study of rules and concepts only insofar as
such study encourages the spurious belief that they actually describe
what courts or people are really doing.
3 6
For example, in the very article which launched the realist
movement - A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step (1930),
Llewellyn actually undertakes a detailed and searching examination
of the nature of legal rules. From this examination it is clear that
Llewellyn's so-called "rule-skepticism" was not directed at the
negation of legal rules but at the clarification of their role in the
judicial process.3 7 In Llewellyn's view, prescriptive legal rules must
be divided into two categories. Firstly, there are mere paper rules -
rules which have no observable counterpart in practice; in his own
words, "paper rules" are "what have been treated, traditionally, as
rules of law; the accepted doctrine of the time and place - what the
books there say 'the law' is". Secondly, there are "working rules"
- rules that do have counterparts in practice, or else are
"consciously normatized" by legal officials. 38 Now Llewellyn's
objection to traditional Jurisprudence was not that it studied legal
rules but rather that it failed to distinguish between mere "paper
rules" and the actual "working rules". 3 9 Quite how the jurist should
set about discovering the "working rules" is left unstated but this
analysis clearly distinguishes Llewellyn's approach from that of the
prediction theory and from the behaviorist view of rules being mere
stimuli to which legal officials respond by some unconscious - and
unstated - psychological process.
Of course, Llewellyn also stresses in the same article the need
for a study of the actual behavior of judges and he causes no little
degree of confusion by terming the practices of the courts "real
rules" but it is quite clear that Llewellyn's conceptual scheme -
even at this early stage - allows for an adequate balance of emphasis
between operations and perspectives.
40
It is interesting to note that during the 1930's Llewellyn actually
wrote a tentative draft for a book called The Theory of Rules.
41
36. "Some Realism about Realism" 43: ". . . what the proposed approach means
is not the elimination of rules, but such setting of words and paper in perspective as
can hugely step up their power and effect".
37. "A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step" 27.
38. Ibid., at 12 n. 9.
39. Ibid., at 17-18.
40. Ibid., at 21-22.
41. See Twining, op. cit., at 200-202 and Appendix B (in which Twining attempts
to synthesize Llewellyn's many writings dealing with legal rules).
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Professor Twining has indicated the degree to which this unpublished
manuscript foreshadows The Common Law Tradition42 and it is
certainly further evidence of Llewellyn's concern with maintaining
an adequate balance between operations and perspectives - even in
his most "realistic" period of development.
Llewellyn's awareness of the need to maintain this balance
becomes increasingly evident as his later writings developed it into an
explicit theme: for example, in 1940, having rejected the prediction
approach to legal rules as being inadequate, he went on to say that
"The Newer Jurisprudence must work out the relation, in the judge's
actual work, of the ideal and ideological elements in our legal system
to the words of the rules of the law; or the relation of either to the
going institutional practices of courts and judges." 4 3 In The Norma-
tive, The Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method
(1940), Llewellyn maintains this emphasis by drawing a sharp dis-
tinction between "Law-ways" and "Law-stuff" which must both be
studied by an scholar purporting to pursue the goal of a comprehen-
sive Jurisprudence. "Law-ways is used to indicate any behavior or
practice distinctively legal in character, flavor, connotation or ef-
fect". "Law-stuff is used to mean any phenomena in the culture
42. The relationship of the 'Theory of Rules' to the 'whole view' is quite
straightforward: rules are one of the main instruments (no more, no less) for
performing the law-jobs and as such they deserve special attention. Improving the
quality of legal rules is one of the most important tasks of juristic method; the Grand
Style offers the preferred model for rules of law- 'the rule with a singing reason'
which at once provides guidance to judges, a reliable basis for prediction to prac-
titioners and is, as far as is compatible with the other functions, capable of being
understood by non-lawyers. Twining, op. cit., at 201-202. For a more full discussion
of Llewellyn's early conception of the nature of legal rules and concepts, see L. L.
Fuller, "American Legal Realism" (1934), U. Pa. L. R. 429. This article is largely a
review of Llewellyn's early book, Prajudizienrecht Und Rechtsprechung in
Amerika, Eine Spruchauswahl Mit Besprechung (Theodore Welcher, Leipzig,
1933). From Fuller's quotations it appears that Llewellyn devoted more thought to
the nature of rules than many of his contemporaries
43. "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence" 145. See also Llewellyn's
further statement one year later: "Rules are measures based on ideals, practices,
standards or commands, measures cast into verbal form, authoritative verbal form,
with sharp-edged consequences. They are a well-nigh indispensable precondition to
any degree of standardization of law-work across space and the generations. They
stand with such relative conspicuousness to observation, they accumulate so easily,
they can be gathered so conveniently, and they are so easy to substitute for either
thought or investigation, that they have drawn the attention ofjurisprudes too largely
to themselves: to the rules - as if rules stood and could stand alone." Llewellyn, My
Philosophy of Law (1941) 188-189. For the approach of legal realism generally, see
F. V. Cahill, Judicial Legislation: A Study in American Legal Theory (The Roland
Press Co., New York, 1952) 116-118.
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which relate discernably to the legal; it includes rules of law, legal
institutions of any kind, lawyers, law-libraries, courts, habits of
obedience, a federal system: in short anything in the culture whose
reference is discernably legal."
44
6. Conception of Authority and Control
Llewellyn delineates with considerable care both the aspects of law
which we characterize as 'authority' and 'control' although it must be
understood that he does not treat them as separate conceptions;
rather, he lumps them together into a single compendious conception
of "authority". The analysis here discussed appeared at a late stage
in Llewellyn's jurisprudential development and is evidently one of
the products of his close collaboration with the young anthropologist,
E. Adamson Hoebel.
In Llewellyn's view, the "legal" pre-supposes a process of
"socially significant normative generalization"; "All socially sig-
nificant normative generalization which is in origin an eternal process
of emergence from the mere living of any group" consists in "a
projection and idealization" of "right patterns" of different degrees
in precision and generality. Now this process depends, according to
Llewellyn, on two crucial factors:
One factor urging powerfully in the direction of such socially
significant normative generalization may be thought of as
quantitative. If interlocking behavior gets patterned in fact, with
a resulting back-and-forth of adjusted action and adjusted ex-
pectation, deviations will bother; generalizable pictures of
rightness and of rights are pretty well bound to result...
A second factor urging in the direction of socially signific-
ant normative generalization may be thought of . . . as
qualitative. The stress, the spectular and memorable drama, the
brain-sweat, of a trouble-case, though it be an utterly unique
one, drives by its whole quality toward generalization; and this
doubly, if the trouble-case becomes, as many do, the occasion
44. "The Normative, The Legal, and The Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method" (1940), 49 Yale L. J. 1355, 1357-1358. See generally G. Gurvitch, op.
cit., at 172-183. It is clear that Gurvitch seriously underestimates the degree to which
Llewellyn maintains a balance of emphasis between operations and perspectives.
Finally, we may note Llewellyn's spirited reply to such critics as Roscoe Pound:
"The misconception lies in conceiving that everyone thinks facts are all that
Jurisprudence is concerned with, merely because he cries out for needed facts or in a
particular preliminary study tries to report facts as objectively as possible . . ."
"Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond" (1958), 15 New York University Law
Quarterly Review 159, 162 n.
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for awakening to, and voicing, normative drives which have
been building unnoticed.
45
However, normative generalization is only a part of what goes to
generate and to make up the "legal". The generalization, says
Llewellyn, must somehow be "accepted, effective on or consonant
with men's behavior."
It must be more; it reaches beyond the normation of oughtness
into the imperative of mustness. The "legal" has to do with
ways and standards which will prevail in the pinch of challenge.
• . . it is vital to see the possibility of the emergence of a
"legal" structure . . . which makes its own claim to its own
variety of oughtness regardless of the "inherent" rightness or
justice of its any part or of its net weight: its claim to observance,
obedience, authority, effectiveness because, but merely be-
cause, it is the effective expression of the recognized going
order of the Entirety concerned. 46
In other words, the "legal" is this process of patterned normative
generalization insofar as it is bound to "authority" and regularity. By
way of summary, Llewellyn identifies four attributes or "clusters of
attributes" which can be drawn together into the compendious con-
ception of "authority": "(a) There is a necessary element of
effectiveness or existence in and as part of the Entirety concerned:
some quantum of de facto obedience to or acquiescence in a mandate
or ukase, or in a disposition of a trouble-case . . . (b) There is an
element of supremacy: in the pinch the "legal" must prevail as
against any competing standard or authority . .. (c) There is an
element of enforcement, of sanction, of perceptible teeth to call into
play against the challenger. . .(d) There is an element of recognition
that what is done or commanded or set as imperative or as norm is part
of the going order of the Entirety concerned; not merely acceptance,
but an attribute about the why of this acceptance: an element of
officialdom."' 4 7 Unfortunately, Llewellyn never adapted this
analysis for the purpose of empirical study of the modern legal
system; indeed, the hear-say nature of the data used by Llewellyn and
Hoebel meant that this analysis smacks more of the speculative than
the empirical even in respect of a primitive legal system. Yet, the
analysis nevertheless remains an impressive contribution to our un-
derstanding of the nature of law.
45. "The Normative, The Legal, and the Law-Jobs" 1360-1361.
46. Ibid., at 1364.
47. Ibid., at 1367.
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7. The Relationship Between Law and the Social Process
". .. it would seem to go without demonstration that the most
significant. . . aspects of the relations of law and society lie in
the field of behavior..."48
Right from the beginning, Llewellyn laid great emphasis upon the
need for a searching examination of the relationship between law and
the social process. Indeed, in one of his earliest published articles,
Law Observance versus Law Enforcement (1928), 49 he sets forth a
most convincing statement of the limits of law as an effective instru-
ment of social control: "Law observance to be generally effective
requires that folkways in conformity with the purposes of the law
shall have been first developed. It is the folkways, not the law, which
are known; it is the folkways, not the law, which in our present
scheme of things offers some guaranty of people learning and
following." 50 Furthermore, once it becomes clear that law obser-
vance is a question of folkways rather than of rules it must also be
recognized that such rules and folkways are not uniform but diver-
sified at different levels throughout society. Consequently, according
to Llewellyn, any problem of law enforcement must be viewed as a
problem of altering the conduct patterns of specific individuals.
51
This became a theme to which Llewellyn returned on many subse-
quent occasions.
Llewellyn's concern with the relationship between law and the
social process is similarly demonstrated by his functional analysis of
the constitutive process in his article, The Constitution as an Institu-
tion (1934).52 In this stimulating work, Llewellyn views the constitu-
tion not as a mere document but as a 'living institution': "An
institution is in first instance a set of ways of living and doing. It is not
in first instance, a matter of words and rules. . . . Every living
constitution is an institution; it lives only so far as that is true. 53 Any
48. "A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step" 16.
49. Jurisprudence Ch. 18.
50. Ibid., at 401-402. This passage, with its emphasis on "folk-ways", lends
credence to Twining's view that Llewellyn was influenced by the work of William
Graham Sumner - particularly by the latter's Folkways (Dover Publications, New
York, 1959). Llewellyn came into contact with Sumner's ideas while he was at Yale
College and a pupil of Sumner's disciple, A. G. Keller. Twining also points out how
Llewellyn's "law-ways" appear to be adapted from Sumner's "folkways". See
generally, Twining, op. cit., at 92-93.
51. Jurisprudence ch. 18, at 410.
52. (1934), 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1. In J. Hall (ed.), Readings in Jurisprudence (1938)
970.
53. Ibid., at 970. We have already noted the crucial place which the concept of
The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn 461
working constitution, according to Llewellyn, is a highly complex
type of institution and it can most profitably be seen as the interaction
of the different ways and attitudes of three diverse categories of
people; (a) the specialists in governing; (b) the "interested groups";
and (c) the "general public". Of these groups, Llewellyn maintains
that the specialists in governing stand at the center of the whole
process. 54 However, he did not pursue this analysis any further and it
was not really until his collaboration with Hoebel that he developed
this tentative institutional approach into a fully comprehensive theory
of the functions of law in society.
55
Instead of concentrating on structural factors, Llewellyn de-
veloped the notion of a social institution so that he could highlight the
functional aspects of law: "The central aspect of an 'institution' is
organized activity, activity organized around cleaning up some job.
In the case of the major institutions (of which the institution of law is
one), the jobs concerned are vital to the continued existence of the
society or group." ' 56 Llewellyn's basic thesis is that every social
system or social subsystem has certain fundamental needs that must
be satisfied if the group is to survive. Llewellyn's expression of the
purpose of law is to be found in his enumeration of five so-called
"law-jobs": In My Philosophy of Law (1941), these jobs appear as
follows:
(1) The disposition of the trouble-case: a wrong, a grievance,
a dispute...
(2) The preventive channeling of conduct and expectations so
as to avoid trouble, and together with it, the effective
re-orientation of conduct and expectations in similar fash-
ion.
"Institution" holds in Llewellyn's Jurisprudence. Twining indicates that
Llewellyn's approach was most probably derived from the work of W. G. Sumner
and from an article by W. H. Hamilton, in 8 Encyl. of the Social Sciences (1937) 84.
See Twining, op. cit., at 93 and 176-177. In his unpublished manuscript, Law in Our
Society, Llewellyn defines "institution" in the following manner: "An institution is
in the first instance organized activity built around the doing of a job or a cluster of
jobs. A craft is a minor institution. A major institution differs in that its job-cluster is
fundamental to the continuance of the society (or group) with typical resulting
complexity": Twining, op. cit., at 177.
54. "The Constitution as an Institution" 972-975.
55. See generally, D. E. Ingersoll, "Karl Llewellyn, American Legal Realism, and
Contemporary Legal Behaviouralism" (1966), 75 Ethics 253, esp. 261-262.
56. "Law and The Social Sciences- Especially Sociology" in Jurisprudence ch.
15, at 355.
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(3) The allocation of authority and the arrangement of proce-
dures which mark action as being authoritative; which
includes all of any institution, and much more.
(4) The positive side of law's work, seen as such, and seen
not in detail, but as a net whole: the net organization of the
soceity as a whole so as to provide integration, direction,
and incentive.
(5) 'Juristic Method', to use a single slogan to sum up the task
of so handling, and of so building up effective traditions
of handling the legal materials and tools and people de-
veloped for the other jobs to the end that those materials
'and tools and people are kept doing them better, until they
become a source of revelation of new possibility and
achievement. 57
All groups develop institutions whose function it is to perform the
law-jobs. As Professor Twining notes, in Llewellyn's later usage
"law-and-government" or "law-government" is the term used to
refer to such institutions. 58
Each law-job presents primarily an aspect of "pure-survival".
The job must be performed sufficiently well for the group to keep
functioning. But beyond this "bare bones" aspect, each law-job has
a "questing-aspect" - "a question of surplus and its employment".
On the one hand, the questing aspect searches for a more efficient
performing of the law-job and, on the other hand, it looks towards
ideal values: "such organization and such ideals of justice as tend
towards a fuller, richer life". 59 As we shall see, Llewellyn refuses to
treat such ultimate ideals as a legitimate object for his study; hence he
stops short with the first element in the questing aspect of the
law-jobs.
Apart from the law-jobs, one of the more interesting aspects of
Llewellyn' s work in The Cheyenne Way (1943) is its concentration on
the events which precipitate the situations in which authoritative
decisions are called for. Llewellyn stresses the need for an under-
57. My Philosophy of Law 186. In other works, Llewellyn sometimes split the
second law-job into two parts thus arriving at a total of six law-jobs in all. See
Twining, op. cit., at 175.
58. See Twining, "Two Works of Karl Llewellyn" (1968), 31 Modern L. Rev.
165, 175. In, Karl Llewellyn and The Realist Movement 179-180, Twining shows
how "in the late 1940's Llewellyn adopted the concept 'law-government' in prefer-
ence to 'law'. His justification for joining together 'law' and 'government' was that
these two terms are often used to refer to institutions which are primarily concerned
with the same basic function 'the job that is fundamental to the existence of any
society and of any social discipline at all; it is the job of producing and maintaining
the groupness of a group."
59. The Cheyenne Way 292.
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standing of the dynamic tensions that shape the law and manifest
themselves in claims; according to Llewellyn, investigation of claims
reveals much about the social grouping which any given claimant
may represent. 60 The recognition of the need for a study of such
precipitating events and of the claims process is thus an important
contribution to our understanding of the relationship between law and
the social process.
After Llewellyn's death, Hoebel summarized his colleague's
approach to law and society in the following manner: "Llewellyn
approached and studied both law and law-in-society as a process.
Society is flux, and form exists only in enduring relationships of
flowing action. Concentration on the law-jobs as a feature of
theory-method has the virtue of relating the law (as all other compo-
nents of the socio-cultural system) as a subsystem of the whole. For
the jurist this is a powerful antidote to any law-centered tendency to
treat law and its doctrine as sui generis. But for the anthropologists of
the 40's, its value was to bring law directly into the swelling stream of
functional thought in anthropology."
61
However, while Llewellyn's theory of the law-jobs is an im-
pressive account of the basic functions performed by a legal system it
hardly serves as an adequate account of the complex relationship
between law and society. As we have seen, Llewellyn's failure to
apply the trouble-case method to an ongoing legal system forced him
to side-step many crucial issues of social and legal structure; further-
more, his exclusive concern with functions permitted him to ignore
such vital issues as the patterns of control existing in a society, and
the influence of goals and objectives on institutional development.
6 2
In short, Llewellyn's conceptual framework was tragically inade-
quate. If one views the social process as consisting essentially of the
60. "The dynamic tensions which lead to law-stuff, feed it, and give it material to
work on, show up peculiarly in claims-claims repudiated or resisted or merely
unfulfilled; claims asserted as "right" or "rightful" in the context of the going order
of some particular group or Entirety. For a claim never exists in vacuo. The particular
group order which it pre-supposes is as much a part of it as the claimant. ibid., at 276.
61. A. E. Hoebel, "Karl Llewellyn: Anthropological Jurisprude" (1964), 18 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 735, 742. For the influence of Malinowski and Sumner in stimulating
Llewellyn's interest in anthropology, see Twining, op. cit., at 92-93, and 153-154.
62. These particular weaknesses have often been cited as undesirable tendencies of a
functional approach; however, since Llewellyn never studied an ongoing legal
system these weaknesses are even more apparent. See generally, 0. Young, Systems
of Political Science (1968) esp. 34. See also the criticism of a legal scholar; L. L.
Fuller, op. cit., at 448-453.
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interaction of human beings with human beings and with resources, it
is clear that a systematic Jurisprudence must be capable of concep-
tualizing and then measuring the impact of law on the distribution of
resources and vice versa: this Llewellyn's Jurisprudence fails to
achieve. 63
Part of the problem with Llewellyn's treatment of the relation-
ship between law and the social process stems from its "abstract-
ness". This latter characteristic is - to some extent - a result of
Llewellyn's failure to apply this theory to an ongoing legal system;
however, it is also a result of Llewellyn's remoteness from the check
of rigorous field-work. Without the stimulus of day-to-day acquain-
tance with the subject matter of social theory, the scholar is inclined
to become more and more abstract in his theoretical formulations:
unfortunately, as Professor Twining has suggested, Llewellyn was
remarkably unenthused by the prospect of systematic field-work:
In respect of socio-legal research Llewellyn was more of a staff
officer than a foot soldier. Neither by temperament nor by
training was he suited to the systematic collection of data. He
knew that he was incurably innumerate and was mildly worried
by the knowledge. Typically he wrote almost entirely from his
head; even the ordinary spadework of combing the law reports
for relevant authorities did not come naturally to him although
he often disciplined himself to do it; he was not methodical
enough to be a good field worker, although his 'artistic' qual-
ities sometimes produced spectacular results. He broke most of
the rules of empirical method - not for him the carefully
constructed research design, rigorous sampling techniques or
the scrupulously tested questionnaire. He spent little or no time
in the field for his principal works. He stayed only ten days
among the Cheyennes; the rest of the collection of material for
The Cheyenne Way was done by Hoebel. . .For only one major
project, the study of the Pueblo Indians, did Llewellyn do a
considerable amount of fieldwork; instead of remaining a de-
tached observer, he became emotionally and actively involved
in Pueblo affairs; it is perhaps not a coincidence that this project
was never completed.
6 4
By way of summary, we might say that Llewellyn went considerably
further than most of his contemporaries in plotting the interaction of
63. For the type of approach that might be adopted, see H. 0. Lasswell, "Toward
Continuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society" (1967), 21 Rutgers L. Rev.
645. This work is perhaps too detailed and complex in many respects but the basic
concepts are highly serviceable.
64. Twining, op. cit., at 193-194. Note also Llewellyn' s failure to submit himself to
the discipline of scientific work during his research for his early work, "Behind the
Law of Divorce" (1932), 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1281 and (1933), 33 Colum. L. Rev.
249; ibid., at 194-195.
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legal and social processes; however, his endeavors came to grief
largely because of his exclusive focus on one aspect of this interaction
- namely the functions of "law-government". As we have indi-
cated elsewhere, the reasons for this inadequacy stem partly from
matters personal to Llewellyn but also from the general lack of
intellectual aid and comfort from the ranks of the social scientists. 65
8. The Intellectual Tasks Performed by Llewellyn's Jurisprudence
(i) The Clarification of Goals.
".. . every man of conscience must hold his own perceptions of
Justice to be the basic ones.' '66 "The democratic way. . . rests to my
mind on preference and on faith. I am content to let it rest on faith.
Faith is a good foundation.' '67 Along with the mainstream of pragma-
tic realism Llewellyn pays little direct attention to the task of goal
clarification. The cardinal tenet of his early writings is the simple
message that the function of legal science should be regarded as being
purely descriptive and that it must be sharply distinguished from the
normative "art" practised by the judge and advocate.68 Nowhere
does Llewellyn deny that a comprehensive Jurisprudence must deal
with attitudes and expectations in addition to overt behavior and
nowhere does he renounce the jurisprude's task of considering the
purposes of law together with the ideal pictures of society towards
which such purposes may drive. Nevertheless, in Llewellyn's view,
the function of a descriptive legal science is to inform the normative
jurisprudential art and in order to do this effectively it must temporar-
ily divorce itself from speculative ideals. 6 9 For Llewellyn, therefore,
an empirical legal science is the foundation stone for a modern
65. Typical of this lack of mutual understanding between jurisprudence and social
science is the reluctance of the Columbia Anthropology Department to supervise a
thesis about 'law'. Instead, E. A. Hoebel was supervised by Karl Llewellyn and out
of this partnership grew The Cheyenne Way. See Twining, op. cit., at 154-155. This
is not to suggest that individual social scientists were unsympathetic to the demand
for greater co-operation between lawyers and social scientists. However, the gargan-
tuan task set by the legal realists called for a commensurate effort by the social
scientists to make the high hopes for modem Jurisprudence a reality: For various
reasons, this concerted effort was not forth-coming until the post-war period.
66. Twining, op. cit., at 186: quoting from a lecture given by Llewellyn in 1955.
67. "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law" (1942) in Jurisprudence ch. 8,
at 212-213.
68. See H. Yntema, "American Legal Realism in Retrospect" (1960), 14 Vand. L.
Rev. 317, 325.
69. "Legal Tradition and Social Science Method" 86.
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Jurisprudence: it seeks to inform - but not to deny - the traditional
normative concerns of lawyer, judge, and jurist.
In his recent book on Llewellyn, Professor Twining draws
attention to unpublished materials which make Llewellyn's own
basic values reasonably explicit: "Without committing himself to a
fixed hierarchy of values, he claimed to give a high priority to four
values: tolerance, basic minimum respect for human dignity, 'decent
attention to need as well as merit', and 'a fair hearing before a fair
tribunal'. He was far from being a dogmatic egalitarian maintaining
that equality was the residual value, which ought to operate unless
inequality could be justified in terms of some other value such as
merit or the need of the whole group."
70
However, in his published works, Llewellyn does not openly
reveal these underlying values and his approach to the task of goal
clarification is shrouded in obscurity. All that is certain is that
Llewellyn rejected the view that discussion of "ultimate ends" was
useful and staked his faith on the technique of pragmatism: "...
when it comes to ultimate substance of the Good, I repeat that I can
find no clarity, nor any conviction of reason or of deduction as to
specific matters, from the broad ultimates others have found clear. I
put my faith rather, as to substance, in a means: in that on-going
process of check-up and correction. . . which is the method and the
very life of case-law . . .The pragmatic way is no way to reach an
ultimate or absolute, but it is the only sound way to apply an ultimate,
however reached. '
'71
Nevertheless, during the war years when criticism of the ethical
foundations of legal realism reached its zenith, 72 Llewellyn pub-
lished an article which did imply certain basic goals. In On the Good,
The True, The Beautiful, in Law (1942), Llewellyn undertook a brief
discussion of the concept of "Justice". In this article, he argues:
The first meaning of Justice which makes sense to me is what I
shall call net Justice in the social scheme. It has to do with the
organization of the whole society, of which the whole institution
of Law [-Government] is for most purposes but an efflux and a
voice - though the institution of law is of course also capable of
being made one major tool for reorganizing society.
70. Twining, op. cit., at 186-187.
71. "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law" 211-212.
72. For the crucial role of the Second World War in forcing the realists to defend
their position on the matter of legal ethics, see E. A. Purcell, "American Jurispru-
dence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis in Democratic Theory" Dec.
1969 American Historical Review 430-431 and 441.
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This net Justice, as I conceive it, however, does not in first
instance voice an appeal to Law, not even to change in Law. It
voices in first instance a yearning that the less pleasant attributes
of men-in-groups and indeed of men-as-individuals might dis-
appear, and that something other and better might be substituted
for them. It then expresses clearly that aspect of the Good, as the
thinker sees it, which has to do with men's equal access to
desired things - positions, powers, enjoyments, opportunities
- things of which there are too few to meet all desires. . . The
problem of social Justice - net Justice - begins, as I see it,
with getting something to be just with; and that is a group-job. It
takes precedence. That group-job calls for organization, discip-
line, leadership, and leaders. The ensuing problem of net Justice
looks then peculiarly to the development of the disadvantaged.
It looks to that development from two angles: the first angle is
that of fairness and of the dignity of human beings; the second
angle is that of wisdom, because refreshment out of the unde-
veloped is the way of hope for all. In this there is nothing
concrete, and you could fit the formula, if you want to call it
that, about as well to Hitler's state as to ours, or to some really
ideal or actual democracy. With due hesitation, as I ponder on
deep thinkers who have found otherwise, I conclude, thus far,
that that is about as far as the available ultimate goals give
guidance for concrete applications.
73
Quite what Llewellyn means by "net Justice" is by no means clear;
however, the gist of the argument would appear to be this. Since
societies or social groups only have limited resources at their dis-
posal, "Justice operates under the principle of scarcity". In
Llewellyn's view, each society or social group must therefore de-
velop its own system of "distributive justice" for the sharing of the
values actually at their command. Now Llewellyn's notion of 'social
justice' would emphasize 'fairness', the 'dignity of human beings',
and 'wisdom' [the adoption of the standpoint of society as a whole in
the making of decisions].
According to Llewellyn, the attainment of 'social Justice' must
be approached along pragmatic lines - within the context of a
particular group or a particular dispute: ultimate goals can provide no
clear guidance in these matters. Hence the task of Jurisprudence
should be to concentrate on the concrete application of goals to
specific problems rather than the postulation of high order goals
without reference to any particular society or group. In Llewellyn's
view, the "enrichment" of social life was also a vital task for those
entrusted with the leadership of society but he was not personally
73. "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law" 202-204.
74. Jurisprudence, ch. 5.
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prepared to charter the course along which such "enrichment" might
lie - that was a task for the philosophers and was an infinitely more
abstract task than that of attaining 'net social justice'. For Llewellyn,
the latter task was necessary to the very existence of any social group.
Once the task was being performed reasonably adequately, the juris-
prude could simultaneously turn his attention to the application of
those ultimate goals recommended by the philosophers: however,
such application would necessarily be carried out as part of a process
of accommodation and compromise. Once again, Llewellyn pinned
his hopes for social improvement on pragmatism.
Another example of Llewellyn's approach to the task of goal
clarification is illustrated by his subtle reply to his natural law critics
in the article, One "Realist's" View of Natural law for Judges,
published in 1939. Llewellyn's adroit argument runs to the effect that
both legal realism and natural law are essentially attempts to enhance
the responsibility of judicial decision-making. 75 Each school, he
argues, endeavors to evaluate law in terms of its on-going value.
Insofar as natural law is merely the name given to a universal human
urge or drive for "right, or decency, or justice" it is "an interesting
and highly useful complement to legal empiricism." Yet Llewellyn
parts company from his strange bedfellows by refusing to assert
explicitly any value preferences whatsoever. According to him, the
role of the legal scientist is to discover whether our present legal
arrangements are adequate for the performance of their purpose
within the social process as a whole and, in his view, such questions
can only be dealt with on a pragmatic basis.
76
75. This is an argument later made by two leading commentators on American legal
realism: (1) H. W. Jones, "Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism"
(1961), 61 Colum. L. Rev. 799, at 801: "The ethical theory to be drawn from legal
realism is, I suggest, that the moral dimension of law is to be sought not in rules and
principles, but in the process of responsible decision, which pervades the whole of
law in life." (2) F. V. Cahill, op. cit., at 124: "In this aspect, therefore, legal realism
is an assertion of judicial responsibility. The judge must employ more than "judg-
ment" in the solution of human difficulties. The law offers solution to the problems
that come before him; the judge must formulate his own solutions. In the end "(t)he
only guarantee of judicial wisdom will remain the judge." (quoting Llewellyn).
76. It is interesting to note that in an appendix to the Common Law Tradition,
Llewellyn attempts to disarm those who criticize him for having failed to take
responsibility for any definite value preferences by arguing that 16gal realism was,
after all, only a "method": ". . . realism was never a philosophy, nor did any group
of realists as such ever attempt to present any rounded view, or whole approach ...
what realism was, and is, is a method, nothing more, and the only tenet involved is
that the method is a good one. 'See it fresh', 'See it as it works' - that was to be the
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While Llewellyn's reluctance to assert ultimate goals is under-
standable in the light of the philosophical and methodological as-
sumptions underlying legal realism 77 it is hard to grasp why he
refused to undertake the task of surveying the goals cherished by the
other participants in the ongoing social order. This failure is all the
more remarkable when it is remembered that Llewellyn argued that
law must give effect to the changing expectations of reasonable men:
"In a regime of change, certainty in law is attained whenever change
in the judge's ways moves in step with changes in the expectations of
relevant laymen. 78 One is entitled to ask why Llewellyn did not
consider the demands of relevant laymen to be of equal significance
as an object of study.
(ii) The Analysis of Past Trends in Decision.
". .. If different judges find different lines of argument persua-
sive in leading to a single result, then it would seem to follow
that judges' reactions to the facts are more nearly alike, at least
are more predictable, than are their reactions to the forms of
words we know as legal rules." 79
Like other former students of Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld, such as
W. W. Cook, Llewellyn placed great emphasis upon the need for a
foundation of any solid work, to any end." The problem with Llewellyn's argument
is that it completely ignores the assumptions underlying the realist movement and -
in particular - his own work. Note Rumble's criticism of Llewellyn's argument:
"... any definition of realism as the method of "seeing it fresh," seeing it clean,"
and "come back to make sure" is unsatisfactory. In the first place, such a definition
is inconsistent with the much more fully documented interpretations of the realist
movement forwarded by Llewellyn in his articles of the 1930's. In the second place,
to define realism as a method is historically inaccurate. The advocates of "realistic
jurisprudence" did believe that the use of the method so vividly described by
Llewellyn is desirable; but they shared a number of other assumptions and theories as
well. In the third place, to define realism in terms of the particular method alluded to
in The Common Law Tradition is to reduce a rich and vital movement to something of
almost trivial importance. ": Rumble, op. cit., at 135. The question is also discussed
in Twining, op. cit., at Appendix D.
77. However, it is quite clear that the legal realists had very definite value commit-
ments. For a spirited defence of the realists' ethical position, see M. S. McDougal,
"Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention" (1941), 50 Yale L.J. 827,
835-836: ". . . they have been hard at work for the achievement of certain
humanitarian and democratic ideals of intermediate or relatively low-level abstrac-
tion, which most of us share today: civil liberties, social security, more goods to
more people, healthful housing, conservation and full utilization of resources,
collective bargaining, farm security, socialized medicine, protection of consumers,
protection of investors, cheaper and better administration of justice and so on."
78. "Symposium on Law and the Modern Mind" (1931), 31 Colum. L. Rev. 82-90.
79. The Bramble Bush 59.
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narrowing of legal categories so that the factual situations covered by
particular legal rules and concepts should not be too disparate. 80 This
was a lesson that he applied to his analysis of past trends in decision.
A good example of this technique is his early venture Cases and
Materials on the Law of Sales (1931)81 in which the majority of the
cases dealt with were treated in the manner of a summary of the facts
together with the outcome of the decision; somewhat startlingly the
judicial opinions were often ommitted altogether. 82 However, it is
interesting to note that although Llewellyn maintained his concentra-
tion on the 'facts' of a case, The Common Law Tradition witnessed a
reinstatement of the judicial opinion to a central position in the
armoury of the legal scientist.
A further crucial factor in Llewellyn's approach to the analysis
of past trends in decision is his belief that we should not concentrate
solely upon the major 'key' cases which arouse the passions of Law
Review editors. In his view, we must learn to analyse the flow of
judicial decisions on a much wider time-frame: "For the long haul,
for the large-scale reshaping and growth of doctrine and of our legal
institutions, I hold the almost unnoticed changes to be more signific-
ant than the historic key cases, the cumulations of the one rivalling
and then outweighing the crisis-character of the other. "83 Thus,
although Llewellyn lists 64 techniques of dealing with precedents,
his analysis of a series of appellate cases in The Common Law
Tradition reveals that the use of the simple citation overwhelmingly
outnumbered the use of any other technique and that the technique of
citation in fact obscures the process of continuous judicial creativity
which takes place even in such run-of-the-mill cases: "beneath what
looks on the page as mere following there swirls a constant current of
creation".84
80. For the influence of Hohfeld on the realists and- in particular- on Cook, see
Twining, op. cit., at 34-37; for the influence of Hohfeld on Llewellyn, see 97-98.
See also Twining's assessment of the relationship between Cook and Llewellyn
at p. 98.
81. See generally Twining, op. cit., at 128-140; "Two Works of Karl Llewellyn"
(1967), 30 Modem L. Rev. 514.
82. Of particular interest is the enormously painstaking index. The purpose of the
time-consuming enterprise was evidently part of Llewellyn's attempt to classify
decisions in terms of their factual context rather than their wide-ranging legal
classification. For example, Llewellyn has a separate index in which commodities
are listed irrespective of any legal characterization.
83. The Common Law Tradition (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1960) 109.
84. Ibid., at 116-117; and see further p. 190: ". . . the present material may make
permanently untenable any notion that creativeness-choice or creation of effective
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However, it is to be regretted that Llewellyn fails to consider for
the purposes of trend-analysis any decisions other than those emanat-
ing from a judicial body. Similarly, it is a further point of criticism
that he does not examine trends from the point of view of the goals
towards which they are moving or from the point of view of their
effect on the distribution of resources within the society. Perhaps the
most important, and certainly the most original, aspect of
Llewellyn's analysis of trends is his discussion of judicial "style".
By this he means to refer "not to the literary quality or tone, but to the
manner of doing the job, to the way of craftmanship in office, to a
functioning harmonization of vision with tradition, of continuity with
growth, of machinery with purpose, of measure with need". 85
Llewellyn argues that trends in American appellate decision-
making can best be classified according to their general period-style.
In his view, the "Grand Style" is the term which best characterizes
the craftsmanship of such outstanding judges as Mansfield, Marshall,
and Cardozo, on the one hand, and the work of the American courts in
general during the 1840's and 50's, on the other. By way of contrast,
the decisions of American appellate courts from the 1860's to the
early 1940's are characterized as representing the "Formal Style".86
For Llewellyn, the essence of the "Grand Style" is that "every
decision is to be tested against life-wisdom, and that the phrasing of
the authorities which build our guiding structure of rules is to be
tested and is at need to be vigorously recast in the new light of what
each new case may suggest either about life-wisdom, or about a
clearer and more usable structure of doctrine." 87 In his view, the
grand style is the "best device ever invented by man for drying up
that free-flowing spring of uncertainty, conflict between the seeming
commands of the authorities and the felt demands of justice".88 In
contrast the formal style has a devastating effect on the reckonability
policy by appellate judges - is limited to the crucial case . . . the tough and
exhausting case, the case that calls for lasting, conscious worry. My material aims to
put beyond challenge that such creativeness is instead everyday stuff, almost every-
case stuff, and need not be conscious at all".
85. Ibid., at 34. See Twining, op. cit., at esp. 210-215. Note, especially, a most
useful diagrammatic representation of the differences between the formal and grand
styles at 213.
86. See generally Rumble, op. cit., at 200-205. The period of the Grand Style
apparently lasted from the time of Jefferson's Administration to that of Grant's. The
shift away from the formal style supposedly began in the early 1940's.
87. "On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition;; in Jurisprudence ch. 9,
at 217.
88. The Common Law Tradition 37-38.
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of decision which Llewellyn feels every appellate lawyer has a right
to expect; his cryptic definition of the style runs as follows; "Author-
ity was authority; logic was logic; certainty was certainty; heart had
no place in legal work; esthetics drove in the direction of cold
clarity"; 8 9 unlike the grand style there was no conscious and overt
concern with policy. Of course, Llewellyn was not pretending that
considerations of "fairness, rightness and decency" were absent
from proponents of the formal style; rather he was suggesting that
such considerations were not articulated in an open and regular
manner. Now Llewellyn's thesis was that the formal style which had
dominated American appellate decision-making for some 80 to 90
years (and had aroused the passionate opposition of Holmes, Pound,
and the realists) was on the wane; more specifically, he argued that
the early 1940's witnessed a return to the grand style by the majority
of appellate jurisdictions. Furthermore, Llewellyn's main objective
in The Common Law Tradition was to bring the grand style to the
attention of the average lawman and to advocate its use as the best
means of tackling the problems facing an appellate court. As a
consequence, Llewellyn considered style to be a fundamental factor
in conditioning appellate judicial decision; hence we must now turn
to a consideration of the scientific task.
(iii) The Scientific Task: The Analysis of Factors Conditioning
Decision
The number of Factors "held equal" (in the judicial opinion)
• . . is unbelievable if measured in terms of any known experi-
mental techniques. Furthermore, in the same series of reports,
one can simply move five or six years, and then commonly find
a 'control group' in which again oodles of identifiable factors
are held more equal that they are on any large scale in today's
normal (and expensive) testing methods.90
The Common Law Tradition represents a marked departure from the
general reluctance of American legal realism to treat the judicial
opinion as being anything more than a rather unhelpful ex post facto
rationalization of a decision. The nature of this departure is clearly
formulated by Harold Lasswell:
By relying on this method - the examination of appellate
opinions - Llewellyn puts himself in direct opposition to
89. "On the Good, The True, The Beautiful in Law" 183. For the argument that the
Grand Style was largely confined to such fields as Labor Law and Constitutional
Law, while the Formal Style flourished elsewhere, see Rumble, op. cit., at 212-213.
90. The Common Law Tradition, at 514.
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anyone who holds that opinions do not disclose the intellectual
processes by which decisions are made . . . Llewellyn (holds)
• . . that the style of thought exhibited in opinions is inescapably
interwoven with the method of problem-tackling actually emp-
loyed by the decision-maker. He asserts, then, that the way a
judge thinks is to some extent inferrable from the content -
whether the purport or the style - of what a judge says. When
the mode of saying permeates the opinion-writing of an entire
epoch or jurisdiction it is plausible to conclude that talk-ways
are also thought-ways. 9 1
In other words, Karl Llewellyn made the judicial opinion the
foremost tool in his performance of the scientific task.
On the basis of his detailed analysis of a long series of appellate
opinions, Llewellyn devised a list of fourteen assorted factors that
'steady appellate decision' and which can thus be regarded as condi-
tioning factors; they are: Law-conditioned officials; Legal Doctrine;
Known doctrinal techniques; Responsibility for justice; The Tradi-
tion of one single 'right answer'; An opinion written by the court; A
frozen record from below; Issues limited, sharpened, and phrased in
advance; Adversary argument by counsel; Group decision; Judicial
security and honesty; A known Bench; The General Period-style and
its promise; Professional judicial office.
92
Now if anything binds these fourteen factors into any kind of
conceptual unity it is the twin-notions of "craft" and "tradition". As
to the former notion, Llewellyn's work with the Cheyennes con-
firmed his belief that the techniques of use of any legal form or rule
are often more important than the form or the rules themselves:
indeed, in his article, On Reading and Using The Newer Jurispru-
dence (1940), he makes this point in a pungent manner:
On the particular matter of judging, the newer Jurisprudence is
persuaded that the older by putting on the doctrines of law more
weight than those doctrines do bear or can bear alone, have put
too little weight on the art and craft of the judge's office. One
studies that art and craft by studying particular officers at work
in their office, and seeking for the similarities in their attitudes
and behavior. This has been misconceived as being a delving
into the vagaries of individuals: what it is, instead, is a search for
91. H. D. Lasswell, "Review of the Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals"
(1961), 61 Colum. L. Rev. 940, 943-944. For the paradox inherent in Llewellyn's
concentrating upon what he called "the lawyer's ancient practice" and the departure
from realist tenets, see G. Casper, Juristischer Realismus und Politische Theorie im
Amerikanischen Rechtsdenken (Dunker and Humblot, Berlin, 1967) 60-61. See also
Twining, op. cit., at 229-23 1.
92. The Common Law Tradition 19ff.
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predictabilities and proper lines of work in the judge's office
which transcend individualities. 93
Central to Llewellyn's discussion of "the art and craft" of appellate
judging is his concept of period-style, which we have discussed in
connection with his analysis of past trends in decision. However,
Llewellyn's treatment of style as a conditioning factor is extremely
unsystematic and vague.
As Lasswell points out, Llewellyn does not bring together a
workable general statement of how to analyse appellate opinions for
the purpose of comparing them with one another according to their
degree of approximation to the Grand Style or to the Formal Style.
9 4
Indeed, Llewellyn compounds matters by stressing three almost
meta-physical concepts - situation-sense, reason, and wisdom - as
criteria for identification of the Grand Style. 95 Nevertheless, Lass-
well manages to isolate three principal considerations involved in
drawing a distinction between the two period-styles. "Firstly, the
degree of emphasis put on relating a specific rule of doctrine to a
general principle of the legal system"; secondly, "the care taken to
characterize the factual context on which the original contraversy
arose"; and thirdly, "the attention given to estimating the future
consequences of the possibilities considered, and especially to
clarifying the norms ratified by the decision as binding upon future
participants in contingent situations". 9
Closely connected with - and indeed often overlapping with-
the concept of "craft" is that of "tradition". In Llewellyn's view,
"one of the more obvious and obstinate facts about human beings is
that they operate in and respond to . . .traditions, and especially to
such traditions as are offered to them by the crafts they follow". 9
7
Among the more important of the traditions which condition judicial
93. "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence" 135-137.
94. Lasswell, op. cit., at 944.
95. "Situation sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts in their context
and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working result, coupled with
whatever the judge or court brings and adds to the evidence, in the way of knowledge
and experience and values to see with, and to judge with. Wisdom will serve well
enough to indicate a goal of right decision weighted heavily with and for the future.
Reason I use to lap over both of these, and to include as well the conscious use of the
court's best powers to be articulate, especially about wisdom and guidance in the
result.": The Common Law Tradition 60-61. See Twining, op. cit., at 216-229, for a
detailed discussion of these concepts. In particular, the problem of the alleged
"meta-physical 'nature of the concept-'situation-sense' - is discussed in detail.
96. Lasswell, op. cit. at 944-945.
97. The Common Law Tradition 53.
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decision are those surrounding the concept of "judicial office". 98
According to Llewellyn, appellate judges have to a real degree
become "pavloved" in their views by office and especially by
service. 9 9 A further aspect of Llewellyn's emphasis on tradition is his
discussion of the importance of legal doctrine; in his view, judges are
"law-conditioned" and they perform their duties within an environ-
ment of authoritative legal doctrine and - strange as it may sound
from the lips of a legal realist -he argues that it should be recognized
that legal doctrine does "at times actually shape" the outcome of the
decision-making process. ' 0 0
The problem with making an assessment of Llewellyn's perfor-
mance of the scientific task, however, is that he wrote The Common
Law Tradition primarily as a handbook for the practising appellate
lawyer rather than as a systematic contribution to legal science. His
objective, as we shall see, was to demonstrate that appellate decisions
were much more 'reckonable' than was popularly believed and that
the fourteen "steadying factors" operated in concert to produce a
98. ". . . a deep and rich as-of-course grasp of the idea and ideal of this office is
revealed when our language to describe it has no need to strike close to the mark. The
typical word, used as a sufficient word, is "impartial", which describes a condition:
"not on either side, and without personal interest or desire re the outcome" is about
as far as that word really takes you, though the dictionaries tend to add "just". But
we mean when we use the word about a man in judicial office a great deal more. We
mean, and definitely in addition, "upright". We also mean- and if we stop to think
we know that we mean - not a passive but a positive and active attitude: the judge
must be seeking, as best he can, to see the matter fairly, and with an eye not to the
litigants merely, but to All-of-Us as well. We mean further, and importantly, still
another attitude: "Open, truly open, to listen, to get informed, to be persuaded, to
respond to good reason." Nay, more; we gather this into one weak, bleak word
"impartial" a drive: an idea of effort, of self-denying labor, toward patience, toward
understanding sympathy, toward quest for wisdom in the result." : The Common Law
Tradition 46-47. For professional judicial office as the "major restraint on the use of
judicial freedom", see Rumble, op. cit., at 152-153.
99. The Common Law Tradition 206.
100. The kind of rule which Llewellyn believes can shape the course of decision is
succinctly described in an earlier article; "Impressions of the Conference on Prece-
dent" (1940) in Jurisprudence Ch. 6: "The precedents and the lines of precedent
which do not fool us, but guide us clearly, and which guide the judges too, are the
precedents which do two things together: first, they state a clear reason along with a
rule which really sorts out different states of fact for easy sizing up; and second, they
state a reason which satisfied us as making sense. Such rules, our best rules, control
and guide and satisfy, and open clear lines for their own limitation or development.
Such rules, and such rules only, afforddynamic certainty." The development of such
rules became an integral part of Llewellyn's approach to the drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, see generally Twining, op. cit., at 270-340 and especially
Appendix E.
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reasonable regularity in appellate decision. Consequently, Llewellyn
does not attempt to construct any sort of model of the decision-
making process in which each factor is carefully weighed in terms of
its relative impact upon the shaping of decisions.' 01 For example,
Llewellyn ignores the possibility of systematic fact-analysis along
the lines of Underhill Moore's institutional method or, alternatively,
the possibility of intensive research into the effect of individual
personality along the lines of study recommended by such scholars as
Glendon Schubert. 102
101. See the appraisal of T. L. Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern
Jurisprudence, (Rand McNally & Co., New York, 1964) 63-64: "Unfortunately,
however, Professor Llewellyn jumps off in mid-stream and neglects to extrapolate
upon the nature of the interrelationship between the elements, as well as many other
problems raised by a mere listing. Bare mention and a brief description of each
element is deemed to be sufficient by Llewellyn. Nevertheless, we do find what is
probably the most elaborate analysis of the nature of those discrete elements that
substantially contribute to a constraint upon a judge (as contrasted with all other types
of policymakers) in arriving at a choice between alternatives." See generally,
Rumble, op. cit., at Ch. IV.
102. For a discussion of Llewellyn's work in relation to judicial behaviouralism, see
Ingersoll, op. cit., passim. It is clear, however, that the author tends to underestimate
the degree to which Llewellyn ignores systematic prediction and fails to grasp the
crucial importance of Underhill Moore's systematic approach; see G. Schubert,
Judicial Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research (Rand McNally, Chicago,
1964). Introduction by Schubert. Professor Twining has made two important re-
marks in this connection. Firstly, he points out that Llewellyn perhaps surveyed far
too many cases in his attempt to demonstrate the renaissance of the "Grand Style";
in Twining's view, the vagueness of such concepts as "situation-sense" and
1'grand" or "formal" style does not merit the laborious scanning of reports,
undertaken by Llewellyn. However great the number of cases examined, the vague-
ness of the key concepts would militate against the ascription of the title "scientific"
to Llewellyn's research: "Llewellyn claimed that he read his samples of opinions in
much the same way as historical documents are read by historians. He reported at
considerable length on his findings. Although the pages are enlivened by frequent
incidental observations, he concentrated for the most part on indicia of the Grand
Style and the Formal Style and on the precedent techniques that were being used by
the courts. In fact in analysing the cases he was concerned with a rather limited range
of variables; he did not, for instance, consistently have regard to factors relating to
the socio-economic status of the judges or the parties, or some of the other factors that
have been given prominence in jurimetric analysis. He made no attempt to quantify
his findings and only spasmodically doffed his cap to systematic social science
techniques. Nor did he always distinguish very closely between data and interpreta-
tion. A first condition of objective analysis is the establishment of precise categories
with criteria of identification which eliminate personal judgment except in borderline
cases. The limitations of 'Grand Style', 'situation sense' and other central concepts
in Llewellyn's analysis have already been explored. When Llewellyn reads through
twelve cases from Massachusetts and reports that he finds clear use of situation sense
in at least six of them, an element of trust on the part of the reader is still demanded
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Perhaps the best summary of Llewellyn's achievements in The
Common Law Tradition is to be found in a most tactful passage of
Lasswell's review of the publication: "If Llewellyn's pioneer forays
are to be verified and extended it will be necessary to supplement his
free-wheeling summary by methods that add preciseness and consen-
sual validity to the research. It is not a matter of attacking studies of
the kind supplied by Llewellyn; rather, the question is how to sup-
plement and to verify the many hypotheses about trend and
conditioning factor that have been introduced into the forum of
discussion, study, and action." 10 3 However, not all the critics have
been so kind; indeed, there is a measure of substance in the grumbl-
ings of Takeo Hayakawa who argues that there "does not seem to be
much new except his peculiar way of presentation and terminology
which operate to impair the scientific value of the work:" ". ..
Llewellyn is a passionate poet who is fascinatedly singing the praises
of the "Grand Style". His esoteric terms lack communicability, but
give the work the charm of mysteriousness and abstruseness . . . he
seldom goes beyond common sense in approach or in insight
. . ."104 As we have seen, Llewellyn did not really present The
Common Law Tradition as a systematic contribution to legal science
so it is really somewhat unfair that criticism has been heaped upon
him for not achieving what he had no intention of achieving in the
first place. Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that after all
Llewellyn's calls for an empirical or scientific Jurisprudence his
followers had some cause to be disappointed with his magnum
even though Llewellyn gives a brief paragraph to each case. A student who goes off
to read the same run of cases before he reads Llewellyn's interpretation may well
arrive at the same conclusion, but it is by no means certain that he will. Indeed, the
reader is sometimes left with a nagging suspicion that the vagueness of the indicia of
the Grand Style and Formal Style allowed Llewellyn's subjective preferences to
creep into his analysis. Thus despite the enormous labour put into his treatment of his
samples of cases, Llewellyn's method seems somewhat casual and impressionistic
. ..Llewellyn's principal hypotheses - that there is a renaissance of the Grand
Style and that there is a wide range of precedent techniques - are so vague that a
systematic method of analysis was not necessary to support them.": Twining, op.
cit., at 250-251. The second point, made by Twining, concerns the fact that
Llewellyn's book only discusses reported opinions: yet, in an earlier work, he had
estimated that about 70% of appeals to the New York Court of Appeals were disposed
of WITHOUT an opinion. In these circumstances, it was difficult for Llewellyn to
make the claim thatThe Common Law Tradition was "a realistic study of a particular
type of institution as it operates in fact". Twining, op. cit., 249-250.
103. Lasswell, op. cit., at 944.
104. Hayakawa, op. cit., at 728.
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opus. 10 5 The Common Law Tradition has important implications for
future research but, as it stands, it does not really go beyond the level
of a brilliant, muddled, and unsystematic work representing the
rushed attempts of a great scholar to muster all his common sense and
experience before he died.10
6
(iv) The Projection of Future Trends in Decision.
Llewellyn's belief when he wrote The Common Law Tradition was
that the public's demand for certainty in the law had caused a crisis of
confidence in the appellate system. 1 0 7 He saw his last work as being
an attempt to restore that confidence by showing that, if the material
was handled correctly, there should be a considerable degree of
reckonability in American appellate decision. It was to this end that
Llewellyn drew up his celebrated list of the fourteen "steadying
factors". It was Llewellyn's firm belief that if the appellate lawyer
was made aware of these fourteen factors - and particularly of the
Grand Style - he would be enabled to understand the manner in
which the judges actually tackle the problems presented to them for
resolution; with this knowledge Llewellyn believed the appellate
lawyer should then be able to forecast the probable shape of future
trends in decision with a reasonable degree of certainty. 108 Llewellyn
also argued that the appellate lawyer can himself contribute to this
reckonability by bringing to the court's notice an adequate under-
standing of the background facts which will enable the judges to see
the instant case as falling within a situation-type: "One might derive
a suspicion that development can almost be forecasted by the
situation in suit. The situation-type could sometimes be seen by way
of the opinion to be at work in shaping the decision and the rule. But
105. See Twining, op. cit., at 266 for critics' reaction to the book.
106. See Twining, op. cit., at 266-269, for a generous appraisal of the work.
107. The Common Law Tradition 5. Twining indicates that his alleged "crisis of
confidence" was never fully analyzed or documented by Llewellyn and it is sug-
gested that it may well have been little more than a "rhetorical device' Twining,
op. cit., at 268.
108. Ibid., at 178. "I submit that the average lawyer has only to shift his focus for a
few hours from "what was held" in a series of opinions to what those opinions
suggest or show about what was bothering and what was helping the court as it
decided. If he will take that as his subject matter, I submit that the average lawyer can
provide himself, and rather speedily, with the kit of coarse tools we have been
discussing and with evidence, too, of his own ability to use that kit to immediate
advantage."
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the situation must reach the ear and understanding of the particular
court or judge." 
1 0 9
However, as we have seen, Llewellyn does not take a systematic
approach to the decision-making process; indeed, it is quite clear that
he does not aspire to the prediction of individual cases on a scientific
basis. This was a path that he did not care to tread in the company of
Underhill Moore and the later judicial behavioralists. In sum,
Llewellyn's performance of the projective task once again paves the
way for future research but it does not deserve the recognition of
being either scientific or comprehensive.
(v) The Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
"Juristic method is the problem and the technique of solution, for the
Entirety, and the problem of keeping the machinery of the law abreast
of the needs of the Entirety. "1 10 In Llewellyn' s view, the core of the
jurist's art must always be the provision of wise counsel to the judicial
decision-maker. Now although he clearly spurns the intellectual task
of goal clarification Llewellyn nevertheless devotes considerable
space to an exposition of the pragmatic methods which may facilitate
the onerous task of rendering responsible- and effective-judicial
decisions.
As a result of his work with the Cheyenne Indians, Llewellyn
developed the firm belief that a judicial decision respecting any
particular case must - as far as possible - simultaneously perform a
variety of critical functions. Firstly, it must adjust the instant dispute
with the maximum of speed, smoothness, and permanency together
with a minimum outlay of effort and disruption of other legitimate
social activities. Secondly, it must attempt to satisfy the 'felt justice'
of the case while at the same time laying down a rule that will
ultimately redound to the greater "social health".' 1 ' In The Common
Law Tradition, Llewellyn puts it in this way:
... in a going life-situation, fairness, rightness, minimum
decency, justice look not only back but forward as well, and
so infuse themselves not only with past practice but with good
practice, right practice, right guidance of practice: i.e., with felt
values in and for the type of situation, and with policy for legal
rules ...this drives the whole 'justice' idea, inescapably in
some part . . . forward, into prospect, not merely retrospect:
109. Ibid., at 156-157.
110. The Cheyenne Way 309.
111. Ibid., at 294.
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into what one can perhaps call the quest for wisdom in the
decision. 112
Llewellyn argues that there are two main passkeys to the halls of wise
decision. One such key is the judge's open quest for what Llewellyn
calls "situation-sense" or "situation-rightness"."1 3 By this he
means that the judge must learn to sense the situation of which the
immediate case is a type. On this basis, the important facts cannot be
the detailed events of the present contraversy but rather the
background facts which pave the way for the judge to apply the
"immanent law" of the situation: "Only as a judge or court knows
the facts of life, only as they truly understand those facts of life, only
as they have it in them to rightly evaluate those facts and to fashion
rightly a sound rule and an apt remedy, can they lift the burden
Goldschmidt lays upon them: to uncover and to implement the
immanent law.'" 114 Professor Twining argues most convincingly that
the use of the phrase "immanent law" is not intended to herald a
headlong plunge into the realm of metaphysics - in his view, all
Llewellyn means is that a judge who can categorize the facts of a
particular case into a generalized type of situation will be in a perfect
position to recognize the crucial issues of policy at stake. Often there
will be an underlying consensus within a group which will dictate a
'correct result'; if no such consensus exists, then at least the relevant
conflicting policies will have been clearly identified. 15 According to
Llewellyn, the 'formal style' - with its absence of situation-sense -
112. The Common Law Tradition 60.
113. Ibid., at esp. 194-195.
114. Ibid., at 127. It is interesting to compare Underhill Moore's research on
business practices ( and their affect on judicial decisions) with Llewellyn's approach
to "immanent law" in The Common Law Tradition. Both approaches bear some
resemblance to Eugen Ehrlich's "living law". Twining analyses the phrase, "im-
manent law", at great length but does not mention Ehrlich or Moore. (See Twining,
op. cit., at 216-227). However, Twining suggests that Llewellyn's use of
Goldschmidt's phrase may owe something to a similar passage in Corbin's paper,
"The Law and the Judges" (1914), Yale Review 234. In any event, the Goldschmidt
passage, referred to, reads as follows: "Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as
the legal order can take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its
right law. This is a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere
reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of
man and of the life conditions of the time and place: it is thus not eternal nor
changeless nor everywhere the same, but is in-dwelling in the very circumstances of
life. The highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering and implementing this
immanent law." Quoted in The Common Law Tradition 122.
115. Twining, op. cit., at esp. 226-227.
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is quite unable to identify such policies: hence the unsatisfactory
nature of those decisions delivered under its influence.
The second key to wise decision rests in the judge's need on the
one hand to refer to the past experience of judicial decision-makers as
expressed in legal rules and doctrine and, on the other hand, to
formulate rules that are clear both in application and in reason so that
future decision-makers may be blessed with ever sounder and ever
clearer guidance for the future. 116
Of course, these so-called keys to wise decision do not furnish
us with even the barest skeleton of a systematic procedure for evaluat-
ing policy alternatives; no doubt much of this bareness emanates from
Llewellyn's refusal to evaluate such alternatives in the light of com-
munity goals. Furthermore, it is probably a fair comment that these
keys of guidance smack more of the interests of the practising lawyer
than of Karl Llewellyn, the legal realist. Yet - at the very least -
these keys do furnish us with a vivid, albeit inadequate, account of
the conflict of duties that rest on the shoulders of those judges
purporting to make rational decisions.
116. It is interesting to note that Llewellyn stresses the need for a form of rule-
utilitarianism as opposed to calling for justice solely within the bounds of the instant
cast (c.f. the approach of Frank). In this respect, Llewellyn's work far from being
destructive of legal rules emphasizes their importance in achieving justice for the
"Entirety": ". . . the lines of the best-built rules prove in their turn to cluster along
two lines of non-rule factor in the picture; it is when the rule is clear both in
application and in reason, and when the reason also makes sense in the application
that it talks alike to Jones and Smith, the men, to Jones and Smith, the Americans, to
Jones and Smith, the lawyers, and to Jones and Smith, J.J." My Philosophy of Law
197.
